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Abstract: The current Water Abstraction License (WAL) regime in Italy is no longer flexible enough

to cope with the challenges posed by human-induced climate and global environmental changes.
The cornerstones of the current regime were laid down in the 1930s and have remained essentially
unchanged ever since. The sole noteworthy reform of the Italian WAL regime was the
decentralization of the regulatory competences from the state to the regional authorities in the late
1990s. In this paper, we review the WAL regimes across the administrative regions comprising the
Po River Basin District (PRBD), the largest and economically most important in Italy. PRBD’s WAL
regime includes a rigid and scattered WAL normative that hinders the performance of bottom-up
conflict resolution mechanisms at a basin scale; a water pricing scheme that does not reflect the cost
of water conveyance and use, and does not encourage efficient water allocation; and the lack of a
central WAL register, which delays and in some cases impedes an environmental impact
assessment for issuing new licenses or renewing existing ones, and does not allow prioritizing
applications according to their full economic value. We argue these deficiencies may compromise
both the integrity of riverine and water dependent ecosystems and the economic uses of water. This
paper offers insights that can inform reform of water allocations in the PRBD and elsewhere in Italy
and in Europe.
Keywords: water abstractions license; water fee; water security; Po River Basin District.

1. Introduction
Water scarcity, along with more frequent and severe droughts, are threats that may undo the
efforts to achieve the good ecological status of the European water bodies [1], and short-circuit the
performance of a wide array of sectors driving economic growth [2]. The financial crisis of the past
decade has revealed a high exposure of the EU to economic shocks, including that of extreme
weather and climate-related hazards, exacerbated by fiscal and “other macro-economic imbalances”
[3]. The European Climate Adaptation Strategy [4] has diagnosed that the risk posed to water
security [5] will make up the bulk of the expected climate change environmental and economic
impacts. However, the mitigation of water scarcity and droughts is but the last among the aims
declared in Article 1 of the Water Framework Directive (WFD) [1], and the least substantiated. The
issues of water scarcity and droughts have been further addressed in the EC Communication on
water scarcity and droughts [6], which has identified a more efficient water allocation among the
seven European concerted actions. Efficient water use is also a cornerstone of the EU Resource
Efficiency Flagship initiative, as a part of the Europe 2020 Strategy. The EU Water Policy Review
[2,7] has noted some progress, though as yet insufficient, in drought management in Europe, and in
the application of economic principles (e.g., cost recovery and water pricing). It has encouraged,
cautiously, the use of market mechanisms (e.g., the water right trading scheme) where this
represents a value-added increase [2]. Along with this process, the European Parliament (EP) has
recommended on several occasions a targeted European policy on water scarcity and droughts [8].
There is reason to believe that, along with the growing demand for water, the effects of the
water supply crisis induced by climate change will become particularly pronounced in Southern
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Europe [5,9,10], and especially in Italy [11]. It is widely accepted that the most effective and efficient
ways of adapting to amplified scarcity and droughts are a combination of economic instruments
(e.g,. insurance, and water pricing and trading) along with legislation and regulation in order to plan
more successfully for scarcity and drought spells [2,5,12]. The successful implementation of
proactive water management instruments such as those listed above demands flexible, consistent
and sustainable Water Abstraction License (WAL) regimes [13–17]. Some EU Member States, most
notably Spain and UK, have already started a reform of WAL regimes to address this need.
Water abstraction permits in England and Wales were regulated by the Water Act of 1963 [18].
The permits took into little or no consideration what level of abstraction the water body could
actually supply and the allocation system has since proved to be unsustainable. Current abstraction
levels are causing significant ecological problems in over 1000 river water bodies [19] and 42% of
groundwater bodies are failing [20]. The Water Resources Act of 1991 delegated the task of issuing
abstraction licenses to the Environment Agency [21]. The payment of a fixed fee proceeds with the
application whose amount is stated in the Abstraction Charges Scheme collected by the
Environment Agency (EA). There are three types of licenses: a full license (>20 m3/day); a temporary
license (<20 m3/day over a period of less than 28 days); and a transfer license (trading of full licenses).
Only full licenses are charged the fixed fee by the Environment Agency(as of 2015, the minimum
annual charge for full licenses is £25.00)[22]. All new abstraction licenses granted after April 2004 are
required to include a time limit of typically 12 years. Temporary and permanent water trading for
the whole or part of the WAL are possible but typically require the parties involved to apply to the
Environment Agency for a new license and to change or cancel (revoke) any existing license. The
current WAL regime has proved inadequate in coping with growing challenges. A reform has been
recommended in the Cave Report [23] and supported by the analysis of the Water Service
Regulation Authority (OFWAT) and the EA. The reform, announced in the Natural Environment
White Paper [24] and further substantiated in the Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs
(DEFRA) [25,26], introduces a transition to a new regime by the 2020s. The scope of the reform is to
install flexible and sustainable tradable licensing regime capable to respond to current and future
challenges.
In Spain, water has been managed within hydrological units ever since the River Basin District
Authorities (RBDAs) were instituted back in 1926. The water license holders are granted the right to
abstract and use water of specified volumes and for specific purposes. Water is public, and only a
fraction of groundwater resources is privately owned [27]. WALs are awarded, supervised and
managed by RBDAs, which can limit abstractions either temporarily or permanently, e.g., to meet
environmental regulations. Water charges are exerted through a regulation fee (in Spanish: canon de
regulación, charges for the abstraction and storage costs of surface water), a water use tariff (in
Spanish: tarifa de utilización de agua, charges for the transportation costs of surface water), sanitation
and treatment tariffs, and additional contributions raised by water user boards (e.g., irrigation
communities) [27,28]. The 1999 reform of the Water Law allowed for trading of water entitlements
[28]. Successive reforms have designated a more flexible WAL regime that is able to channel water
abstractions towards economically more efficient uses [27–29]. The RBDA may not authorize the
trading deal in the case of conflicts with pre-existing uses, although the rule of positive
administrative silence applies [30].
In Italy, the WAL regime is tortuous and substandard, reflecting a Byzantine interplay of water
institutions [31]. An abstraction license is required under the Royal Decree (R.D.) n° 1775 of 1933 [32]
for the abstraction of surface waters (such as from rivers, streams and canals) and groundwater.
Since then the regime has evolved through a process of political decentralization and devolution of
environmental protection [33]. As a result, the regional administrations (hereafter regions)Regions)
have gained full jurisdiction over WAL matters. The transposition of the EU WFD in Italy has
prompted a number of legislative and institutional reforms, in which include the 2006
Environmental Code (EnC, in Italian: Testo Unico Ambiente, Legislative Decree 152/2006) [34].
According to the EnC, license holders are entitled to abstract a specified quantity of water from
a particular source and for a specific purpose. The license award is conditional to conformity with
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minimum environmental flows. If the latter are not guaranteed, the regulator may impose revision
or revocation of WAL. Temporary limitations may be enacted during prolonged periods of
droughts. WAL holders are obliged to pay Water Concession Fees (WCF), a part of which, according
to a recent regulation, is earmarked for implementing measures to improve and maintain a proper
ecological status of water bodies [34]. The licenses are specified in absolute terms and are not
transferable. Moreover, the temporal horizons for which the licenses are issued do not take into
account the changing availability of water resources in the medium and long-term, as a result of
climate change. Nor do they consider changes in the demand for water driven by population growth
and economic development. Since human-induced climate change will likely result in a lower
average annual water availability and a greater intra- and inter-annual variability [35], the National
Climate Adaptation Strategy for the Po River Basin District (PRBD) has suggested revising the WAL
regimes [36]. From our analysis of the PRBD case study, we propose recommendations on priorities
for a national water abstraction reform, in line with international best practices on water abstraction
reform [37–39].
2. Water Management in the Po River Basin District
The PRBD is the largest single river basin in Italy, spreading over 71,000 km 2 (24% of the state
territory) and is home to a growing human population of more than 17 million (+6% since 2001, and
expected to increase up to 18–21 million by 2050), most of whom live in small towns and cities with
fewer than 25,000 inhabitants. The PRBD extends over several regions: Valle d’Aosta, Piedmont,
Lombardy (all three almost entirely included in the basin), Emilia Romagna (about half of whose
area is included in the basin), Veneto, Liguria and Tuscany (marginally included in the basin area).
The Autonomous province of Trento is also partly covered by the PRBD. The river basin district
hosts a dynamic economy that generates around 35% of Italy’s GDP, fuelled by some of the most
vibrant industrial hubs in the proximity of the large urban centers of Milan, Turin, Brescia, Modena,
Parma, Reggio nell’Emilia, Ferrara, Monza, Bergamo, Novara and Piacenza. The PRBD also offers
services of strategic importance, including about 1200 hydroelectric power stations representing 41%
of Italy’s hydropower installed capacity, and 1180 thermo-electrical plants that produce around half
of the country’s thermoelectric energy. The PRBD also includes Italy’s largest contiguous
agricultural land area, nearly 21% of its total agricultural area, 21.5% of its utilized agricultural area,
and almost 30% of its agricultural value added [17].
Total water abstractions (consumptive uses) from the Po river account for more than
20.5 billion m3 per annum (Table 1) most part of which (16.5 billion m3) is used in the agricultural
sector, 2.5 billion m3 for drinking water and 1.5 billion m3 for industrial uses. Abstractions account
for 14.5 billion m3 for surface waters and for 6 billion m3 for groundwater [40].
Table 1. Annual average water uses by sources. Legend (* energy production excluded) [41].

Uses
Volume (106 m3/yr)
Surface water (%)
Groundwater (%)
Potable
2500
20
80
Industrial *
1537
20
80
Irrigation
16,500
83
17
Total
20,537
63
37
Water use in the PRBD has increased over the last decades, and the volume of authorized WAL
exceeds average water availability [42]. The problems become more pronounced during the
irregular periods of drought spells. During the spring and the summer of 2003, a severe, persistent
drought afflicted Southern Europe, including the PRBD. The Po River reached its absolute minimum
at the closing section in Pontelagoscuro: −6.99 m or 270 m3/s compared to an average of 1400 m3/s. In
2006 and 2007, Northern Italy experienced another anomaly in terms of precipitation, and in 2007
river discharges were lower than in 2003. Since 2003, a State of (national) Emergency (SoE) under the law
224/1992 has been declared three times (2003, 2006, and 2007) for a total duration of 21 months [43].
Water restrictions during droughts respect the priorities specified in the EnC [34], e.g., first the
household water demand is satisfied, then the irrigation demand and lastly any other miscellaneous

4 of 15

uses. The maintenance of minimum environmental flows was imposed in the late 1980s and later
included in the EnC [34]. If shortages worsen to a SoE, the central government appoints a
Commissioner Delegate with full powers to manage water bodies. With the aim of limiting welfare
losses, the Commissioner Delegate may issue extraordinary water allocation rules that do not
necessarily follow the EnC [34] protocol. The contemporary regulatory framework encourages
voluntary agreements among users before the SoE is activated [34]. These agreements are managed
in the context of the Drought Steering Committee (DSC).
The DSC was initiated and presided over by the Po River Basin Authority (PRBA) in May 2003,
amidst a severe water crisis posing a threat to urban water supplies in the lower part of the district,
and to irrigation throughout the whole district. The cooperative decision of the DSC was sanctioned
by signing a Memorandum of Interest (MoI, in Italian: Protocollo d’Intesa), which stipulated the
commitments of irrigators to reduce water withdrawal by 25 to 50%, and hydropower operators to
release more water from Alpine reservoirs and large regulated lakes. Moreover, the DSC sanctioned
a close monitoring of evolving drought conditions. Since 2003, the DSC has been convened
whenever persistent drought conditions have threatened to strain Italy’s most important economic
regions. The DSC also played an important advisory role during the SoE in the 2007 drought,
institutionalized through the decree of the Commissioner Delegate for the management of the SoE [44].
Notwithstanding the increased frequency and intensity of droughts and the improved drought
knowledge and response in the PRBD, these events are still predominantly managed by resorting to
emergency instruments [45]. Proactive drought management instruments being used elsewhere,
such as (incremental) water pricing [46], temporary trading of water rights [15,39,47], drought
insurance [48] or even drought management plans [49], rely on flexible, consistent and sustainable
WAL regimes that are currently non-existent in Italy. A WAL reform is imperative to define the
main framework for planning and programming activities with a long-term water security
perspective whose aim is to move away from an emergency approach to drought to a proactive and
ongoing one.
3. Water Abstraction Normative Regimes across the PRBD
In 1933, R.D. 1775/1933 [32] established that nobody, not even a landowner, could withdraw
water from natural water bodies without an authorized license. The only exception was water
withdrawal for domestic use by landowners or tenants. Domestic use comprises water supply and
sanitation, watering of gardens and orchards, and/or water used for livestock. This use is exempt
from the obligation to declare withdrawal and hence payment of water concession fees. In both
quantitative and qualitative terms, the impact of this exception is marginal. Under the current
regimes the abstractions that are exempt from permits and fees are subject to limits that vary across
the PRBD regions. In Piedmont, the flow rate must not exceed 2 L/s and 5000 m 3/year, while in
Lombardy it is limited to 1 L/s and 1500 m3/year. Veneto allows water withdrawal for domestic use
in areas not served by aqueducts and limited to 0.1 L/s. In Emilia–Romagna and Valle d’Aosta,
withdrawal limits are not specified.
An informal though widespread exception was made for groundwater use, which remained to a
large extent outside of the WAL regime until 1994, when groundwater abstractions were converted
to formal WALs after Galli Law 36/1994 [50], replaced in turn by the EnC in 2006. [34]. The GL [50]
and the EnC [34] also oblige WAL owners to declare their existence and characteristics in order to
make an overall census possible, although this objective has so far failed to be fully attained in the
PRBD (see Section 5).
The R.D. 1775/1933 [32] distinguished between Small Volume (SV) and Large Volume (LV)
WALs (Table 2). For SV permits, R.D. 1775/1933 [32] entrusted WAL management to the Public
Works Offices (PWO, in Italian: Ufficio Regionale del Genio Civile, is a regional peripheral authority on
a provincial basis, which ensures all the functions relating to the execution of public works, while the
LVs were controlled by the government. With Legislative Decree (in Italian: Decreto Legislativo,
D.Lgs.) 112/1998, the WAL authorities were transferred to the regional governments. Where not
otherwise specified, the provisions of the R.D. 1775/1933 [32] still apply.
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Table 2. WAL differentiation by type of use (source: [32]).
Uses
Small volume abstractions
Large volume abstractions
Hydropower [HP] generation <3000 kW of installed capacity >3000 kW of installed capacity
Irrigation
<1000 L/s or < 500 ha
>1000 L/s or >500 ha
Others
<100 L/s
>100 L/s
The five regions comprised regions included either entirely or substantially within the PRBD,
have introduced to some extent different WAL regimes. Piedmont, Emilia-Romagna and Lombardy
have adopted regulations or regional legislations throughout the period 2000–2006: first Emilia
Romagna (Regional Regulation 41/2001; a Regional regulation, R.r., is not a law or primary source,
but a secondary source that implements and integrates a law) [51], followed by Piedmont (R.r.
10R/2003) [52] and Lombardy (R.r. 02/2006) [53]. Valle d’Aosta, a region enjoying high
administrative autonomy, applies a law which dates back to the 1950s (Regional Law 04/1956; in
Italian: Legge regionale, L.r.) [54]. Veneto governs the WAL through sporadically updated regulations
[55]. In the PRBD, regions issue licenses for LV abstractions and specify water concession fees for all
types of uses. The regional authorities also have the faculty to enforce additional limits and
obligations which the permit holders have to comply with, for safeguarding environmental integrity
and quality and for contributing to the objectives of the regional Water Protection Plans (WPP, in
Italian: Piano di tutela delle acque), which are revised every 6 years. On the other hand, WAL for SV
abstractions are issued by lower administrative authorities, which are also in charge of making
preliminary assessments of the compatibility of new and existing entitlements (both SV and LV). In
Piedmont and Lombardy, the two latter roles are assumed by provincial authorities; in Veneto, by
the PWO; and in Emilia-Romagna by Technical River Basin Services (TRBS), entities in charge of
water management related issues and existing only in this region [56]. In Valle d’Aosta, given its
small extent, the regional public water management office is responsible for both SV and LV
abstraction licenses.
The administrative procedures for the concession of SV and LV WAL are rather similar across
the PRBD regions (Figure 1). Permits are issued upon a satisfactory preliminary impact assessment.
Preliminary assessments include the publication of the water concession application in the official
regional bulletin (in Italian: Bollettino Ufficiale Regionale, BUR), an inspection (conferenza dei servizi)
and, finally, the treatment of contingent oppositions and/or competing requests. Applicants are
charged a fixed fee for the preliminary assessment, as opposed to the variable water abstraction fee
detailed in Section 4. Preliminary assessments may also include the opinion of the PRBA, which
unlike the regionally implemented Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA), is not binding. The
EIA is based on the water concession flow rate and considers the environmental impacts to protected
natural areas, such as Special Protection Areas or Special Areas of Conservation (SACs). Only if the
EIA is positive is the water concession application accepted [34].
The only formal WAL that does not follow the administrative process described above is the
“draw permit” (in Italian: attingimento), a temporary license related to contingent situations that
allows the owner to withdraw surface water by means of mobile pumps. A draw license is granted for
one year and can be renewed a maximum of 5 times. It may be revoked at any time on the basis of
public interest, and without compensation for the license owner. In Piedmont, “draw license” also
exist for the upper phreatic level. Piedmont and Lombardy have specific withdrawal limits for
“draw license” (60 L/s and 40 L/s, respectively, and no more than 300,000 cubic metres per year
each). Emilia-Romagna, Veneto and Valle d’Aosta refer to art.56 of R.D. 1775/1933 [32], which states
that “draw licenses” are the responsibility of lower institutions (the Technical River Authority, the
Public Works Office and the regional public water management office, respectively) as long as: (i)
the water withdrawn is less than 100 L/s; (ii) damage to the river bank is avoided; and (iii) there is no
modification of river conditions or negative impact on environmental uses.
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1. Application for a new WAL
Competent administrative authorities

2. Integration
Competent administrative authorities
verify the application completeness

Yes

No

3. Fee payment
for the preliminary assessment

4. Preliminary Assessment
(publication on the BUR, inspection,
treatment of contingent oppositions
and/or competing requests)

Opinion of the PRBA and other
competent authorities

Environmental Impact Assessment

5. Water license issue

Figure 1. Administrative phases for LV and SV WAL across regions comprised in the PRBD. Source:
Own elaboration

The main water use categories are defined in the R.D. 1775/1933 [32] as civil, drinkable use;
irrigation, energy production, industrial use; and health and sanitation use. The R.D. 1775/1933 [32]
specifies a WAL duration of 40 years in the case of irrigation and 30 years for other uses, although
regional laws may specify otherwise (Table 3).
Table 3. Terms of water uses for regions comprised regions included in the PRBD (source: own
elaboration from [51–55]). Legend: * In the case of water rights allotted prior to 1956, Valle d’Aosta
considers “no limitation” for Irrigation and Potable uses and 99 years for other uses.
Uses
Irrigation
Potable
Civil
Industrial
Fish Farming
Energy
Sanitation
Zootecnic
Others

Piedmont
40
30
30
15
30
30
30
30
30

Lombardy
40
30
30
15
40
30
30
30
30

Veneto
40
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30

Emilia-Romagna
40
30
30
30
40
40
40
30
30

Valle d’Aosta *
40
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30

The application for the WAL renewal must be submitted before the license expires, after the
promulgation of a new regulation that specifies requiring renewal, or in case a substantial variation
of water withdrawal is intended. Piedmont and Lombardy specify tighter time constraints for WAL
renewal: Piedmont’s regulation states that the renewal application has to be submitted at least one
year before the license expires, while Lombardy accepts the application for renewal only if
submitted no later than six months before the license expires. Otherwise, the WAL can be revoked in
which case a new WAL procedure is necessary (Figure 1). In all regions, WAL renewal may be
declined for reasons connected to public interest [51–55].
An existing WAL can be revoked as a result of the following omissions or negligence: (i) the
(intended) water use differs from the one granted; (ii) the user does not respect the conditions and
requirements associated with the license; (iii) failure to pay the abstraction charge for two
consecutive years; (iv) end of term of the concession; (v) sub-licensing to third parties (e.g., trading);
(vi) structural allocative inefficiencies that cannot be addressed through temporary or permanent
limitations in the WAL; and (vii) an inadequate environmental flow (EF) [51–55]. It is worth noting
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that environmental standards for water flows in Italy focus on minimum environmental flows [34]
instead of the ecological flows necessary to guarantee a “a hydrological regime consistent with
achieving WFD environmental objectives in natural surface water bodies” [57]. The legislations of
Piedmont and Lombardy also consider the following cases: (viii) no abstraction for three consecutive
years; and (ix) a failure to install flow rate metering devices, mandatory for new WAL [34].
Different norms and procedures across the PRBD have created a fragmented WAL regime,
managed by regions and numerous lower administrative authorities. This situation is aggravated by
persistent bureaucratic tangles, poor coordination among regions and insufficient supervision.
Besides lacking a unifying set of norms, the PRBD also lacks a coordinating entity with powers
extending beyond the PRBA’s advisory role. Differing water abstraction fees and the largely
uncontrolled overall WAL census reflect this substandard regulatory context.
4. Water concession fees across the PRBD
Water in Italy is charged through water fees and tariffs. Water tariffs are charges imposed on
water storage, treatment and/or supply, and contribute to financial cost recovery of these services
[58]. Water tariffs include charges levied by Land Reclamation and Irrigation Boards (in Italian: Consorzi
di Bonifica e Irrigazione, public institutions that control land reclamation and about 90% of water
distribution in agriculture), and prices domestic users pay for water supply and sanitation services.
Water Concession Fees (WCFs) are charges paid by WAL holders typically according to the volume
of water withdrawal permitted. WCFs were established by art.35 of R.D. 1775/1933 [32] and at
present are fixed and levied by the regions (Bassanini D. Lgs 112/98 [59]). WCFs are detailed in
Table 4 (prices are specified in harmonized units). WALs are typically specified in modules for all
uses except for unmetered irrigation abstractions, where licenses are issued per ha, and hydropower,
where licenses are issued per Kw. For all other uses, modules include the right to withdraw 100 L/s,
except for industrial uses, where modules include a flow of 3 L/s in all regions but Lombardy (again
100 L/s) and Piedmont (1 L/s).
Table 4. Water abstraction fees (as in 2014) for the major water uses across the PRBD regions. Source:
own elaboration from [60–64]. Legend: 1 abstraction with return; 2 abstraction > 3000 L/s; 3 large
volume abstraction (>3000 kW); 4 small volume abstraction, installed capacity < 220 kW; 5 small
volume abstraction, 220 kW < installed capacity < 3000 kW; 6 surface water; 7 groundwater.

Use

Unit

Lombardy

Piedmont

EmiliaRomagna

Veneto

Valle d’Aosta

Potable

€/L/s

22.51

22..22

20.43

43.06

20.49

Irrigation

Metered, €/L/s

0.53; 0.26 1

0.53

0.48

1.01; 0.51 1

0.48

Unmetered, €/ha

0.53

1.16

0.44

0.919

0.45

Industrial

€/L/s

165.30; 333.22

166.74

142.41

300.42

142.97; 71.491

Hydropower

€/kW

15.35; 30.91 3

28.24

13.93

29.38

18.54 4; 22.66 5;
25.76 3

Civil

€/L/s

11.25

11.11

10.33

21.53

2

3.76

6;

7.18

10.25

Fish Farming

€/L/s

3.75

3.74

3.41

Sanitary

€/L/s

11.25

11.11

10.33

21.53

10.25

Zootecnic

€/L/s

11.25

56.72

10.33

21.53

10.25

7

3.42

Where water is abstracted for different uses by the same WAL holder and the volumes
abstracted cannot be split to account for different uses, the WCF corresponds to the water use for
which the highest fee is due. If metering is available, the WCF is proportional to existing uses. In the
particular case where a single water abstraction combines irrigation and hydroelectricity uses
(a traditional practice in the PRBD known as molinare), the WCF corresponds to the use with the
highest fee.
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On top of the regular WCF, hydropower operators pay an additional fee to local authorities for
grants and exploitation of public waters for producing electricity. There exist two supplementary
fees: i) a Supplementary Fee for Riparian Authorities (in Italian: Sovracanone Enti Rivieraschi) is paid
by plants with an installed capacity above 220 kW and amounts to 5.72 €/kW in case the capacity is
below 3000 Kw, and 7.35 €/kW; otherwise, the revenues thus raised are divided among the regions,
provinces and riverain municipalities on a predetermined basis. A Supplementary Fee for Mountain
Basins (in Italian: Sovracanone per bacini imbriferi Montani) is collected by municipalities and paid by
operators located in mountainous areas with an installed capacity greater than 220 kW, amounting to
22.88 €/kW in case the capacity is below 3000 Kw, and otherwise 30.40 €/kW.
The rationale behind the WCF is that of charging water users the costs stemming from the
private use of a public good (art.35 of R.D. 1775/1933), making this instrument the apparent choice
for the recovery of resource and environmental costs of water use [1]. Ministerial Decree 39/2015
developed guidelines for defining resource and environmental costs and identified WCFs as an
adequate instrument for reducing (if water is conserved) or recovering them. Resource costs are
defined as the best use foregone (e.g., opportunity cost); environmental costs are the expenses,
interventions or commitments necessary to restore a good ecological status of water bodies or to
limit or contain damage stemming from a specific use. Environmental and resource costs should
account for both the quantity and quality of water and for seasonal variations [65]. In reality, though,
there is insufficient data on the total revenues annually collected by regions through WCFs, and
these are generally considered insufficient for the purpose of recovering environmental and
opportunity costs [66]. This is aggravated by the WCFs actually declining charges, since the applied
projected inflation rate used for updating WCFs falls far below the real inflation rate (initially
introduced under the Galli Law 36/1994 [50], then replaced by each regional WAL). In addition,
WCFs are calculated on the basis of the potential and not the actual volume of water withdrawn, a
method that removes incentives for water saving/conservation. Metering is a prerequisite for any
incentive charging policy [2] and its adoption has recently increased in the regions included in the
PRBD in the wake of the EnC [34], which made it compulsory to install metering devices for new WALs
[34]. However, the adoption of metering devices in agriculture is still insufficient for implementing
volumetric charges that address region-wide or basin-wide quantitative challenges [67].
There are also substantial equity issues related to WAL charging. WCF rates appear to be
guided more by the user’s ability to pay than by the activity’s environmental and resource costs. For
example in Lombardy, where droughts are becoming an increasingly vital issue, industrial uses
represent 5% of the WAL and 63% of the collected fees. WCFs also vary substantially across regions,
a situation that cannot be explained solely by differing resource and environmental costs, but also by
other economic and policy factors that affect equity among otherwise similar water uses across the basin.
The revenue raised through WCFs in the PRBD is not specifically addressed towards protecting
and/or restoring vulnerable water ecosystems, –in contrast to existing regulations (article 119,
comma 2-a of the EnC [34]). WCFs are typically incorporated the gross regional budgets instead of
remaining a separate line item related to water management. An exception is the region of
Piedmont, which allocates part of its WCF funds to specific (though mostly unrelated to water
management) line items, namely, a fund for the economic support of mountain communities (30% of
the revenues) and water monitoring (5%) in the context of the WPP.
5. WAL Census
Physical water balances (or budgets) are essential for a quantitative management of water
resources [2,57]. Similarly, a census of abstraction licenses is critically important for understanding
water demands within a river basin. Information on the number and characteristics of WALs in Italy
is not publicly accessible. For our analysis we have collected disaggregated data from various
regional and sub-regional authorities, except for Emilia-Romagna, for which we have only obtained
data aggregated at the provincial level. The records are highly heterogeneous. We have reviewed
and processed the data and compiled a database that is nearly equivalent to a census. It includes
information concerning 70,000 abstraction licenses and contains detailed technical and
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administrative information on each of them. Table 4 summarizes water uses in the PRBD. The
heterogeneous units of measurement were converted to m3/s to make them comparable.
Table 4. WAL Census (source: own elaboration based on WAL data collected from regional
authorities [68–72]).

Average water use
Maximum water use
NO. of
% of abstractions
% of abstractions
Uses
Total
Total
abstractions with available
with available
(m3/s)
(m3/s)
information
information
Irrigation
21,909
57.8%
1653.6
17.2%
1690.3
Potable
8180
75.5%
342.0
19.5%
79.0
Industrial
6864
76.7%
411.9
22.0%
49.5
Fish Farming
706
75.2%
32.1
21.2%
10.6
Energy
3430
85.4%
6466.1
49.3%
7531.5
Sanitation
8639
82.6%
13.9
8.4%
3.6
Zootecnic
5798
83.4%
6.6
10.8%
113.9
Other uses
6773
56.2%
24.9
26.8%
22.1
Unspecified use
10,190
0.3%
24.1
0.3%
34.9
Total
72,489
59.8%
8975.1
16.4%
9535.4
The recorded characteristics typically include geographical coordinates of the withdrawal
point, water source/body, type of permitted water use, status of license (active, expired or under
review) and implied conditions, and time limit. The license is specified in absolute terms, either as
average or (less frequently) maximum volume of flow that can be withdrawn. Piedmont, Lombardy
and Valle d’Aosta specify both values. Where the maximum volume of flow that can be withdrawn
is not specified, users have the opportunity to increase abstractions during drought events, precisely
when it is a most valuable resource, and reduce its use during water abundant years so as to comply
with average water use standards. Only some regions record return flows (Piedmont and Valle
d’Aosta).
Withdrawal periods may be limited to irrigation seasons (April–September) but typically
extend over the whole year. Some licenses, especially in the case of irrigation, do not define the
abstraction volume. Therefore our analysis is partly incomplete. As drought spells are becoming
more frequent and intense, gaps in the WAL Census may become a critical issue [37]. In an effort to
improve coordination among the different authorities in charge of managing WAL within the
boundaries of the PRBD, the Piedmont region recently created an online WAL database called the
Water Resources Information System (in Italian: Servizio d’Informazione delle Risorse Idriche (SIRI)) [73].
6. Discussion and conclusion
A more flexible WAL regime in Italy is to be recommended, on account of the observed and
expected decline in water availability, amplified climate variability [36], population growth and
economic development, and as a means of regulating minimum environmental flows. In this article
we look at the case of the of the PRBD, the largest and economically most important river basin
district in Italy. We assess the deficiencies of the current WAL regime and we argue these may
compromise both the integrity of riverine and water dependent ecosystems and the economic uses
of water. The lack of a central WAL register delays and in some cases impedes an environmental
impact assessment for issuing new licenses or renewing existing ones, and does not allow
prioritizing applications according to their full economic value. It also does not allow taking the
edge off the rising conflicts among the different water users during the times of temporary water
shortages. The water pricing in place does not reflect the cost of water conveyance and use, and does
not encourage efficient water use. The regime is too rigid to permit formal or informal agreements
among users, let alone the transfer (temporary or permanent) of existing permits. Finally, the current
regime hinders the performance of bottom-up conflict resolution mechanisms such as the Drought
Steering Committee. A reform should be inspired by international experience [13–16,74], while
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taking into account specific legal, institutional, economic and political conditions, in Italy in general
and in the PRBD in particular. Based on our review we formulate the following recommendations
that contribute to a greater water security in the district:
First, the WAL regime should specify the entitlements as shares of harvestable water resources
and entitle shareholders to periodic allocations of water volumes that can be withdrawn for
approved, site-specific purposes. Environmental outcomes should be managed by establishing
minimum requirements in plans and perhaps by assigning shares to environmental trusts or their
equivalents.
Second, transparency in governance and allocation arrangements should be granted by means
of pre-established rules and procedures out stipulated in the river basin district plans. These rules
should be reviewed periodically, say every ten years, and should clarify when, how and how much
water will be allocated to each share-holder, and under what conditions unused allocations can be
carried forward from one year to the next.
Third, the entitlements should check on the rate of return flow, so as to avoid harming the
entitlements of downstream users.
Fourth, a single register of all water entitlements across the entire river basin district should be
introduced and perhaps made publicly accessible.
Fifth, the river basin (district) authority should play a major role in controlling the
environmental compatibility of the intended withdrawals, particularly for large volume
abstractions. The WAL regime should respect the interconnection of and interaction between
embedded ground/surface water systems, and between land (management) and the water cycle
(run-off, infiltration and evapotranspiration). This, together with the register of entitlements, will
favor the development of environmental-economic accounts [34].
Sixth, in the absence of or during the transition to genuine WAL trading schemes the water
concession fees should be designed as incentives for (more) efficient water use and allocation [58].
The revenues collected by regions should cover operational costs of the WAL regime, including the
monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement costs. It is preferable to design the WCF as
consisting of a fixed component and a variable component. Smart water meters should be installed
for all abstraction licenses; not only for the new ones, but progressively for all existing abstraction
permits.
Seventh, the potential efficiency achieved by making water entitlements transferable should be
analyzed in depth. Properly designed water markets can both reveal the full economic value of
water and facilitate its shift to highest value uses. The ample existing infrastructure favors physical
water transfers and trading with licenses. However, in light of the manifested public opposition [75],
it is not realistic to introduce a genuine trading scheme any time soon. If tradable permits are
developed eventually, statutory plans need to anticipate potential market failures and define rules
for determining whose shares and allocations can be traded.
Eighth, the length for which the WAL should be issued depends on whether or not introducing
tradable permit schemes is envisaged in the long term. If there is an expectation of permission to
trade with WAL in the future, then licenses should be released in perpetuity or, at least, with no time
limits, in order to favor long-term investments and innovation. If not, licenses should be granted for
durations that permit regular “back-end” adaptation to changing patterns of precipitation and river
flow. Any changes in license durations should be managed by rules and procedures set forth in river
basin district plans and/or regional water conservation plans.
These non-exhaustive principles and the complementary public debate have the potential to
overcome the institutional “maze” which characterizes the current WAL regime. Our
recommendations respond to allocation inefficiencies we have observed in the PRBD. They may
have omitted relevant aspects that such a reform needs to tackle elsewhere. Still, our
recommendations draw on EU and Italian policy guidelines [1,2,34,57], and build upon international
standards [16] and experiences. We believe that this analysis offers helpful insights for water
allocation reform elsewhere in Italy and in Europe, not least in river basin districts with similar
characteristics. The new WAL regime should be robust yet flexible, and reliable yet sustainable. It
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should balance robustness at the user level with flexibility at the system level, and address trade-offs
between efficiency and equity, while guaranteeing environmental sustainability and hydrological
integrity.
It is clear that the proposed reform will not be unproblematic. While many recognize that the
current license regime fails to allocate water sustainably and efficiently [76,77], there is a
considerable divergence of opinions on how the regime should be reorganized [78,79]. It is not
conceivable to design, let alone to implement, a reform of a such magnitude without extensive
public consultation and scrutiny. Interest groups, even if small, are well-organized and influential,
and thus are capable of hampering public policy dialogue and impeding transformative change [80].
A practicable way forward for Italy is a stepwise transition to a (more) resource efficient economy
[81,82], an integral part of which is a modern water allocation regime that is consistent with the
principles we have outlined.
This research highlights areas in which a concerted policy response is warranted. Although at
present there is no plan or intention to embark in a similar policy debate, our contribution has shown
that the topic of WAL is important and should be handled with a high priority. Future research
should explore how to inform, open and strengthen the policy dialogue that could eventually lead to
a new WAL regime and a greater water security in the PRBD and elsewhere in Italy. The analysis
and recommendations above represent a first attempt which may help in this regard.
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